The Greek conception of the spirited aspect of soul reaches back to the Pre-Socratics and to the Homeric tradition, and is crucial to tragedy. In public assembly for political protest, perceptions, passions, and embodied ways of knowing are put into action.This work is a philosophical examination of indignation. I examine the Greek notion of the spirited part of the soul which resents injury and resists injustice. To take actions for the sake of one's moral and political dignity and for the moral dignity of others may involve the risking arrest and detention. Challenging the wishes of the political authority to which one owes allegiance has psychosomatic effects. To examine these effects from the point of view of Greek psychic descriptions is the purpose of this study. Both Homeric and tragedic Greek literary contexts, and a contemporary incident of civil disobedience, will inform this discussion.
spirited component of soul and its character tendencies is not intended, however some review is in order.
Plato reduces and localizes thumos to the flaw of thumoietic, irascible, character. Such shorttemperedness and irascibility interrupts the operation of nous, making the person more fit for battle than for peace (Republic VII 547e) and takes away the patience and good will needed for the philosophical pursuit of truth (Republic II). But as Jean Frère asks, " to what extent is the desire for truth (epithumia) yet linked to the thumos that craves truth and justice?" 1 Frère notes that three psychic terms, thumos, epithumia (desire), and prothumia (ardent desire) share the same root and can be said to join in a common implication of dynamism and warm feeling in service of it. This then suggests that a feeling for the political truth and hatred of political lies must be active in political engagement in public life, an engagement that is not cut off from strong feeling which prompts to active dissent.
Aristotle treats thumos as marginal to political life in a well-ordered state. Yet one could argue that commonwealths are not always well-ordered, wise, or true to their values, and that in such cases political action requires that agents have a number of psychic abilities related to strong indignation. One needs spirited perception and engaged imagination, along with the ability to sustain uncomfortable motivational states, in order to be able to stand one's ground and suffer hardship. It is true that Aristotle abandons the root term thumos when discussing virtue, preferring to speak of the role of anger (orge) in the rightly motivated person and courage in the brave (enthumos) person. Nonetheless, it is the very structure of Aristotle's account of moral perception and reason which leads me to re-position thumos in a postmodern and post-liberal theory of political disobedience. For the Aristotelian mean with respect to anger may allow for a rehabilitation of virtues which derives, at least in part, from the complex of narratives of the irascible hero. Aristotle writes For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry-that is easy-or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is rare and laudable and noble. (EN II.9 1109a23-29) Hence, roused and released anger, a marker of indignation and perceived injustice, may be implicated in the difficult act, or even the just act. To undertake this analysis of the body as a source of perceptions of treachery and injustice is to uncover the full reach of the psyche into the body core, its thoracic homeland This is not to say that spiritedness is permanently at odds with the social world; rather it acts out when its normal course of legitimate self-seeking is blocked. The analysis undertaken here leads to the conclusion that there are three principal expressions of thumos in political life. These three expressions of spirited engagement continue to be seen in contemporary resistance to injustice and may help to inform our understanding of the need to resist political authority. In civic life, this psychic element invigorates, detonates, or disrupts.
-A. Thumos invigorates: Thumos energizes civic life as a spirited pursuit of honor in any competition that is regulated to produce a social good.
-B . Thumos detonates: Thumos causes civic life to explode, as in riot, revolution, factionalism, or stasis, a stalemate of factions in government, making its victims incapable of self-governance.
-C. at times to occupy the Aristotelian mean or middle position relative to us and context. The spirited soul which dares civil disobedience challenges the prejudices against it that we have gained from its ridicule in Plato's Republic. A full treatment of the invigorating, detonating, and disruptive/corrective functions cannot be given here, but the hope is that this sketch of a some dispositions of thumos as the mean relative to us will help to reveal the psychic structure of certain forms of political resistance.
Thumos as vitality and invigoration : the path to decisive action under threat of harm or death
In the epic Homeric context, thumos is associated with the conscious control of the body. It leaves the body in a swoon or concussion, and returns to the body upon revival, while by contrast when psyche exits the body death results. According to Caswell 3 the connection between thumos and the breath in living things is strong, since thumos returns when the person breathes again.
Caswell argues that early Greeks modeled their understanding of psychic and divine states on the natural elements, thus thumos is a sort of inner wind that stirs up and rouses the person to action, a sort of turbulent inner sea rolling in the person. This suggests that deliberation was imagined as a sloshing motion of to-and-fro movement. The aptness of the metaphor to the phenomenal feel of deliberation and rousing to action is striking. In the Homeric passages that feature deliberation thumos is often parallel with phren/phrenes, which is or are the physical correlate or "meat" of the "smarts" in us. By contrast, when the context is motivational rather than deliberative, thumos appears in parallel constructions with menos. Diction then marked a difference between activating assessment of alternatives and their consequences, and activating a motivational state that is interested in realizing an outcome. 4 How is it then that thumos registers both the feel of the pull of differing outcomes, and also the motivation gearing up in response to powerful passions? Homer makes this clear. Thumos is what supports acts of daring and enables a Homeric hero to suffer, to endure, and to dare awful things. In virtue of his thumos, or spirited soul, the hero becomes tlemon, bold and stout-hearted. He is resolved and acts. Intellect depends on motive force, and deliberation is inner motion. It would appear that motion is first concentrated and then finally released, with decision in its awful feel retaining the emotional thrust generated by turbulent motions of the spirited soul. Although decision is a firm, settled state, it is not quiescent, at least under the extreme pressures of heroic action. Just as the sailors cannot set sail and follow a course until Zeus or Poseidon permits it, the intellect (phren) sets the course in concert with the spirited part of the soul.
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Thumos has a place in body as well as in thought, making it relevant to contemporary philosophical notions of mind and corporeality. It functions as a source of insight and motivation and is localized in the thoracic cavity, where the motions of the diaphragm and the lungs occur and are felt. How one breathes is of course an indication of the psychic condition of the individual, since emotions affect the pattern and depth of breathing and register adrenalin surges. In Homeric anatomy spirited soul interpenetrates the organ of thought (the phrenes) which itself surrounds the heart (the kardia) in the chest. This soul function is one of pressing on the heart-area and contracting and expanding it in ways often viscerally felt. Psychophysically, the swelling/heaving/lurching soulfunction that is thumos should not be thought of as an organ or as a merely anatomical assignment of psychic states. Rather it should be taken to be an effect on organs and on psyche generally in a particular embodiment. In its intense motion it puffs up the chest and stiffens the body and so too the person's thinking. This is pride and arrogance. At other times the intense motion of thumos moves the phrenes to contract and tighten painfully within the chest; this appears as the familiar feeling of unbearable grief and sorrow.
In its most violent movements thumos heaves, lurches inside us, and swells, as when our heart "swells with pride" or our gut "lurches with alarm" or our soul "heaves with grief". The motions of the motive and deliberative aspects of the spirited soul differ by temperament and are more violent in some people. The earliest poetic references to thumos treat it as a beast that inhabits the gut, a kind of inner corporeal being that lays low at most times but rears up in its bodily cavern and must be placated. Τλημόνα γάςτος έριθον, the daring servant of the stomach, is a version of the inner-man/beast that also imposes the satisfaction of its needs on the civilized man. As Pietro force and his mighty θυμός, will attack men's flocks in order to seize a feast,...
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This beast will destroy human society if it can, like a lion slowly picking off its prey with impunity.
Achilles knows wild things like a lion in that he is yielding to his arrogance and its irrational point of view. Achilles thinks 'does it really matter whether we act nobly or not, since we die either way?'
(Iliad Nine 318-322). His thumos is kakos, wrong in him. In a fine image, Homer tells us that his soul is sideereos, or hard as iron. And even when Achilles returns to battle, the thumoietic mechanism is at work: returns because his thumos grieves so much at Patroklos's death.
In thumos released from the strictures of justice, the ego expands and swells and preens itself in a reverie of self-righteousness and self-importance. 
Thumos as detonation: the conflagration
Medea represents spirited soul as destroyer of civic life. After Jason degrades her as a wife and she loses any rightful place in Theban life, she exacts her own penalty. Here is the pleasure of vengeance pure and simple. Here the excuse of taking justice into her own hands appears to be a justification for indulging in cruelty. The thumoeitic flaw is no longer a dialogue with honor, as in the case of Odysseus, but rather a soliloquy of self-justification. To demi-gods like Medea, mere mortals sometimes look like insects. After her rival is burned and the messenger brings the news,
Medea enjoys this recounting of her triumph:
But the gold crown held its fastenings firmly, and when she shook her hair, the fire merely blazed up twice as high...Her eyes no longer kept their wonted form nor did her shapely face.
From the top of her head blood dripped, mingled with fire, and her flesh dropped from her bones like resin from a pine torch, torn by the unseen jaws of the poison, a dreadful sight to behold.
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The classical scholar Michelini argues that in both Neorion's and Euripides' Medea tragedies "paradox is natural to her role as rebel and figure of exception" 12 She is exceptional in the polis in many ways-Medea is a stranger in a strange land, she is a daughter of a king, she performs daring deeds with and for Jason. Indeed divinely connected as the granddaughter of Helios the sun. She challenges the submission of women to degradation and betrayal and she pleads their case against the faithlessness of men. At times she speaks justly. But can she speak for any sort of justice if she seems led to a thumoeitic plan of unspeakable cruelty against her rival and even her sons?
I argue that two forms of thumos are in tension here. Medea's pleasure in killing her rival is perhaps the ultimate thumoeitic excess of revenge. But when she is heroically overcoming maternal affection in order to enact the penalty of the gods, something else is present. This is thumos as heroic vigor, the terrible daring that makes heroic acts possible. There is arrogance, and there is arrogation.
To call down this duty upon herself is to arrogate power to herself. But once this is done, to fulfill the duty is heroic, since it is one that Necessity imposes upon a mortal. Jason deserves the classic punishment of having his offspring die after breaking his oath to keep Medea as his wife.
Creon's position is also interesting insofar as he represents power and the practical wisdom There is an ordering of duty here: family over strangers, but also protection of the city over mercy for a supplicant. Medea invokes a double grounds for mercy-both with her gesture toward the body of Creon and her attempt to touch his kindness by invoking his newly married daughter. 13 Yet
Creon knows that she has betrayed one city already, perhaps now she arrives to undo another. She appeals to him again as a fellow parent, as one who knows parental love and therefore appreciates the hardship of being forced to leave her sons forever. She asks to remain one day and provide for her children before she leaves for exile. Creon gives in to the reasonableness of this request and makes way for the tragedy to follow.
At other junctures in the play, Euripides' Medea appears in the guise of hero. She is not the same with respect to thumos in its implications for civic life throughout the play. 14 When she is a mother agonizing over completing a vengeance that is righteous in Zeus's eyes, she deliberates with a spirited soul reminiscent of Homer. Like Odysseus, she encourages herself. Interestingly, being in her right mind is associated with the feeling of spiritedness, and not with complacence.
But what is coming over me? Do I wish to suffer mockery, letting my enemies go unpunished?..I shall not weaken my hand…They must die in any case. And since they must, the one who gave them birth shall kill them.
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They must die at all events, and since they must, I who gave them birth shall kill them.
Come, put on your armor, my heart! Why do I put off doing the terrible deed that must be done? Come, luckless hand, take the sword, take it and go to your life's miserable goal! Do not weaken...
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The boys must die because Zeus decrees that Jason must lose his issue if he betrays his wife.: "This man--a god being my helper--will pay the price of his deeds to me. He shall never from this day see his children by me alive, nor will he beget children." 17 Jason must know why his sons are taken from him, and Medea will make that plain. This is in contrast with the vicious attack on her rival which also ends with the death of Creon as he clings to his daughter. As a tragic hero Medea must overcome a temptation to be ordinary rather than exceptional, to be a mere woman rather than a divine granddaughter of Helios, a member of the female sex excused from heroic deeds and the suffering that they entail. Self-justification is the temptation that comes from this weak side, which would give in to maternal love. It is not a fabrication to act according to divine necessity. by invoking the gods' concern with faithful oaths and justice. In translating thumos as 'wrath' and contrasting it with 'calculation', one should consider that such 'wrath' is no longer a private emotion but rather a divine madness that carries forward a penalty that is both divine, and in accord with
Medea's desire to cause Jason his gravest hurt.
As with Odysseus and Achilles, Medea's thumos comes to the aid of the agent who must carry out a dreadful plan. Even a woman must rouse up courage and avoid dishonor, since she has no other male relatives that might act for her. Medea is an ambivalent figure for feminist political agents, yet her spirited soul cannot be gainsaid: "What will her proud soul, so hard to check [megalosplagchnos dyskatapautos psyche], do when stung by this injury?" (M 109-110) . Sometimes the sanctioned marriage is wrong, the force of state is misapplied, and injustice cannot be tolerated.
Achilles is not so completely lost as to rage and kill like Medea, but his situation is different. He battles for the Greeks, she battles for the Gods; still, both justifications provide a cover for selfrighteous excess. Achilles remains intelligible because he has a military duty to kill or be killed. Actuated by friendship and capable of finding a social outlet for his thumoeitic qualities, he returns to battle and does well. Medea has no such social place and for that reason she already the socially explosive and toxic figure. She is dislocated, a stranger, unwanted, and she can play no part in the well-being of civic life. Yet emotions alone cannot sanction action. For us, thumos cannot function as an independent faculty of truth. There must be a rational element which validates, or consolidates the feeling of injustice with the standard by which one knows what is just or injust. Aristotle's moral philosophy offers one such account. Aristotle concedes that there are various applications and forms of anger that must be judged according to the mean. He marks a right angry response in the absence of which "a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself." (EN 5/1126a ). To endure being insulted and to put up with insult to one's friends is slavish, so anger has a part in courage. This claim that a balance of courage and intellect in citizens is itself a political advantage to the state as a whole seems well founded.
But we observe the same differences [in the proportion of these two qualities] among the Greek nations themselves when we compare one with another: some are by nature one-sided, in others both these natural faculties, of intellect and courage, are well combined. Clearly both are needed... ...fierceness is not a mark of natural greatness of mind except towards wrongdoers. As we have said, it is aroused the more strongly with respect to intimates, when we believe ourselves to be wrongly used by them.
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Politics 7 1327b asserts the special merit of being both enthumon and dianoetikon, being both strong of spirit and piercingly intelligent. Here we can find a place for spiritedness and intelligence in a general theory of political and civic action. The spiritedness of thumos is a force in society as well as the individual, in women as well as in men.
A disciplined thumoeitic personality is a possible standpoint for a civic virtue. This would then be a "disciplined irascibility" where thoughtfulness and spiritedness work together to consolidate a social virtue in the individual. This virtue also has a political counterpart: homonoia.
Homonoia is the friendship that binds a community together against a common enemy. The desire of a group to be of one mind can also excite resentments among friends. Such ruptures and disruptions are usually bad, but not always, because the one who differs and stands apart can offer a corrective standpoint that is to the benefit of the community. To act out the rupture through a disruption of supposed unanimity can be beneficial, like draining a festering wound. Indeed, to fail to take the side of justice is to court stasis, the Greek term for political terminal illness. When the civic order is out of order, there is virtue in refusing to be orderly. This is where there is a unique benefit to the examination of what might be thought to be archaic, and therefore, outdated, concepts in Greek philosophy. The discussion of thumos and the value of the daring personality in political 19 Politics 7: 1327b, translated by T. A. Sinclair and revised by Trevor J. Saunders (Penguin, 1981) .
